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I. INTRODUCTION
Gary Schwartz was a prodigiously productive scholar whose works have
challenged and inspired his contemporaries in the academic community, in the Bar
and Bench, and in the American Law Institute (ALI). He has served the ALI with
extraordinarily distinctive contributions to its publications on products liability and
principles of tort law.
His interest in the law of products liability developed from his preparation for
teaching the subject to students in his torts classes, early in his teaching career. It
led to a comprehensive and probing article, Understanding Products Liability,
published in the California Law Review in 1979.' His interest continued through
intervening years and flourished when he served as an Adviser to the Reporters for
the ALI's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabiliy and Reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles).3
In the 1950s through the 1970s, the three decades just before Gary Schwartz's
influence began to come to bear on the subject, the law of products liability was in
a state of significant change. The trigger for change was a set of creative and
provocative judicial decisions in state courts of last resort. The courts making these
decisions were among those most respectedby the courts of other states and by tort
* Judge, United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.
1. Gary T. Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REv 435 (1979).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABLITY (1998).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSIcAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLEs)
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter BASIc PRINCiPLES Tentative Draft No. 1].
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scholars in the law schools around the country. The scholarly ferment also led to
reconsideration in the ALI of its then ongoing development of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.4 Tort law was undergoing rapid change and was unusually
susceptible to thoughtful influence.
Doctrines of privity and warranty, their relationships to common law contract
and tort reasoning, and their relationships to old and new statutory mandates, were
all in controversy. Conflicting views were expressed both in courts and in law
offices where lawyers were advising clients on both sides of potential claims.
Products liability law in action was a thriving source of work and income for
professionals in law. Professional advocates represented claimants and defendants
in increasing numbers of cases before courts in pretrial motion practice and injury
trials when claims survived pretrial screening. The increasing case load was
manifest especially in state courts but also extended to federal courts, primarily
under diversity jurisdiction but occasionally with federal-question issues thrown
into the mix.
In this climate of ferment, fundamental ideas about relationships among
intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability were open to re-examination. Gary
Schwartz was especially sensitive to the potential influence of this point. Not only
could it affect products liability law, it might have an even greater effect because
of its bearing upon underlying principles of tort law more generally, and
relationships among tort, contract, and statutory law.
To illustrate my assessment of Gary Schwartz's special interest in and influence
on tort law, I will use a flash-forward and flash-back method of presentation that
Gary Schwartz used in his 1979 contribution to California Law Review.5 1 do so,
among other reasons, because, as I understand this article, he was using this method
with more wit, irony, and wisdom than many readers have seen in it.
II. THE FLASH FORWARD
The flash forward is to Gary Schwartz's draft for the ALI's Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles).6 In the Discussion Draft
(April 5, 1999), and again in Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 28, 2001), the
Blackletter and Comments of § 2 concerned, among other matters, meanings of
"intent" and "recklessness."
7
"Reckless" or some variation on this root word (such as "recklessly" or
"recklessness") is used more often than any other word or phrase to signify conduct
that has two characteristics. First, it is less blameworthy in kind, and notjust degree,
than intentionally causing harm. Second, it is far more blameworthy than
4. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
5. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 435.
6. BASIC PRINCIPLES Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 3.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 2
(Discussion Draft 1999) [hereinafter BASICPRINCIPLESDiscussion Draft]; BASICPRINCIPLESTentative
Draft No. 1,supra note 3, § 2.
[Vol. 53: 785
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss4/5
HONORING A FRIEND
"negligence." Yet, "reckless" (or a variation on this root word) is also used
sometimes to signify conduct that is only a little more, rather than far more,
blameworthy than "ordinary negligence" (or "failure to exercise ordinary care" as
distinguished from "failure to exercise greater than ordinary care").
In comment b to § 2 of Tentative Draft No. 1, Gary Schwartz, calling attention
to conduct that is more blameworthy in kind than careless conduct (" negligence")
rather than merely especially bad in degree, refers to it as "aggravated
misconduct."' Also, in comment a to this section, he explains:
Terms conveying the idea of wrongdoing that is
aggravated-even though falling short of the wrongdoing
involved in intentional torts-are common in the discourse of
torts. Sometimes, the term used is "gross negligence." Taken at
face value, this term simply means negligence that is especially
bad. Given this literal interpretation, gross negligence carries a
meaning that is less than recklessness.9
Both in his seminal article of 1979 and in the ALl's Tentative Draft No. 1, Gary
Schwartz calls attention to an underlying conception about conduct that is "morally
deficient" as part of the explanation for social perceptions that influence legal
doctrine. In 2001, after reciting illustrations of negligent failures that are instances
of "simple inattentiveness," or the failure of a landowner to inspect the property to
determine some condition, characterizing them as "the person's failure to appreciate
the risk that mainly constitutes the person's departure from reasonable care," he
comments, "such failures, while properly regarded as negligent, normally are not
morally deficient in a way that justifies a finding of recklessness."'"
Comment d to§ 2 of Tentative Draft No. 1 discusses problems associated with
"the balance between the magnitude of the risk and the burden of precautions"11
and is succeeded by comment e on "likelihood of harm" as a factor that is relevant
but not decisive.2
If a high probability of harm is not always a necessary
condition for a finding of recklessness, neither is it always a
sufficient condition for such a finding. To be sure, in many
situations a high probability is generally indicative of
recklessness, in light of the fact that when the actor's conduct
actually makes harm probable convenient precautions are
generally available. Rarely, for example, are there conditions on
land that create a "probability" of injury that cannot be rectified
8. BAsic PRINCIPLES Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 3, § 2 cmt b.
9. Id. § 2 cmt. a (emphasis added).
10. Id. § 2 cmt c, at 24.
11. Id. § 2 cmt d.
12. Id. § 2 cmt. e.
2002]
3
Keeton: Honoring a Friend and His Extraordinary Contributions to Understa
Published by Scholar Commons, 2002
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
by appropriate precautions. In many cases, then, the probability of
injury is a factor that strongly suggests recklessness. Yet under
modem conditions, tort-liability rules are often applied to large-
scale enterprise, with far-flung operations, in which the
correspondence between the likelihood of injury and the
preventability of injury does not hold. Consider an automobile,
mass-produced and distributed nationally, that lacks some
particular crashworthiness feature. The absence of this design
feature may render very probable some number of enhanced
motorist injuries. Nevertheless, whether the feature's absence
renders the car's design defective is a question that cannot be
answered without giving full consideration to all relevant factors.
Because standing alone the mere fact of several probable injuries
does not evenjustify a finding of design defectiveness, it certainly
does not justify the award of punitive damages for reckless
misconduct. Similarly, [in an Illustration in section 1], the
smelter's knowledge of the substantial certainty that its neighbors
will suffer harm renders it liable for compensatory damages; yet
despite the defendant's knowledge of certain harm, punitive
damages may well be inappropriate. Moreover, given the limits on
the substantial-certainty test. .. , a company can have knowledge
that harm will certainly follow from its conduct, yet properly bear
no liability at all. Thus, a railroad company, knowing that persons
will certainly be injured on account of railroad operations, does
not for that reason alone bear liability for those injuries; nor does
a manufacturer bear liability merely because it produces and
distributes a prescription drug, knowing that some number of
consumers will suffer adverse reactions. 3
III. OUR FLASH BACK TO His FLASH BACK
Unquestionably, products liability ranks as one of the most
conspicuous legal phenomena of the last twenty years [1959-
1979], and the California Supreme Courthas played a leading role
in the elucidation of products liability doctrine.'
4
After this opening sentence, Gary Schwartz proceeds with a description of what
the California Supreme Court did and said in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,' 5 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,6 and Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 7 He
13. Id. § 2 cmt. e, at 27-28.
14. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 435 (footnote omitted).
15. 377 P.2d 897 (Ca1.1963).
16. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal.1972).
17. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.1978).
[Vol. 53: 785
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notes that confusion resulted from this sequence but that notwithstanding the
confusion, some things were clear:
Barker established a "two-pronged" test for identifying design
defects. First, a product's design is defective if the product "fails
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." Second,
the design is defective if the risks inherent in that design are not
justified by the design's intrinsic benefits-whether measured in
terms of cost savings, improved performance, or other factors. 8
The 1979 article also called attention to other implications of Barker. First, it
"announced a seemingly dramatic allocation of the burden of proof' under which
"once the plaintiff shows that the 'product's design proximately caused' the
plaintiff's injury, in Gary Schwartz's understanding of Barker, "the design is
deemed defective unless the manufacturer can persuade the jury that the design's
benefits exceed its associated risks."' 9 Second, "the Barker opinion twice indicates
that the jury is to render its risk-benefit judgments upon the basis of 'hindsight."" 0
Third, "in a provocative footnote, the Barker opinion raises the possibility of strict
liability without proof of ordinary defect, for injuries caused by products 'whose
norm is danger."' 2'
This last possibility is by far the most consequential of all. Gary Schwartz
concluded his two-page introduction with notice to his readers that his article would
briefly trace historical development of the existing products liability rule, compare
that rule to a "genuine strict products liability rule," explore relationships among
existing and pre-existing doctrines, and discuss Barker's references to'hindsight'
evaluations of design defectiveness and to "norm-is-danger" products. In the course
of these efforts [this article] will endeavor to achieve an understanding of strict
products liability and, in particular, to establish the relationship between tort and
contract principles within products liability."'
In our flash back to Gary Schwartz's flashback, I believe it appropriate to take
into account that he aimed for "an understanding of strict products liability" that is
sufficient "to establish the relationship between tort and contract principles within
products liability." Thus, he aimed for understanding not only (in a flashback) the
doctrine of strict liability as it had developed in the California Supreme Court
through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but also tort and contract principles imbedded
in that doctrine, and as well (in a flash forward) where they might lead thoughtful
professionals in law-including judges, lawyers, and scholars. For us, the flash
18. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 436 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. (footnote omitted).
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
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forward includes a focus on where this blend of doctrines and principles may lead
us in the years beyond 2002.
I believe we can be aided in thinking about this flash forward by more of the
stimulus to be derived from other indicia of the seminal thinking of Gary Schwartz
as he carried through the exercise he charted for himself in those two introductory
pages of the 1979 California Law Review article.
I turn next to his history of "One State's Experience" in Part I of the 1979
article. Here his flash back goes all the way to 1850 and the situation existing
immediately after California statehood. Before 1900, "not a single personal injury
action against a product manufacturer reached the appellate level, and only one such
action against a product retailer did so."'
Gary Schwartz then takes us through developments in tort, contract, and
statutory proceedings, as well as negligence, strict liability, and warranty, in
California and around the country, through MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 25 in
New York in 1916, its adoption in California in 1934, through Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co.26 in California in 1944, and on to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 27 in 1963.28
He notes that, stimulated by Greenman, the ALI approved the 1965 publication
of § 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts, essentially as it was drafted by the
Reporter, Dean Prosser, "imposing strict liability on the seller of 'any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."'" Gary
Schwartz adds:
Standing alone, "unreasonably dangerous" is a tort-like phrase
that seemingly calls for a comparison of the risks and benefits
associated with the alleged product defect. But comment i,
appended to section 402A, goes on to explain "unreasonably
dangerous" as meaning dangerous "to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." This provides a contract or
warranty-like explanation of defect.30
Here again he reminds us of the more ambitious aim of understanding
relationships among the whole swirl of somewhat conflicting and somewhat re-
enforcing tort, contract, and warranty notions. As he proceeds, he remarks upon
Justice Roger Traynor's recognition in a 1965 address of the "various perplexities
24. Id. at 437 (footnote omitted).
25. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
26. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
27. 377 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
28. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 437-38.
29. Id. at 438 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 438-39 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 53: 785
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inhering in 'defect,""'3 and flashes forward seven years for his next observation:
Then, in its 1972 Cronin decision, the [California Supreme Court]
took two steps. First, it abandoned Justice Traynor's "intended
use" limitation in favor of a test making liability possible
whenever the product's use is "reasonably foreseeable,"
regardless of whether the use is otherwise unintended or
improper. Second, Cronin held that the basic standard of liability
should be "defect" rather than "unreasonably dangerous defect."
On the latter issue, part of the court's reasoning was that
"unreasonably dangerous" is superfluous, since the chief purpose
of that language is to negate Reporter Prosser's fear of automatic
liability [for such things as sugar's harm to a diabetic and liquor's
harm to an alcoholic] and that purpose is fully achieved by
"defect" standing alone. But Cronin also expressed the view that
"unreasonably dangerous" is at least potentially nefarious. Here,
the court was concerned with both style and substance.
Stylistically, "unreasonably dangerous" is wrong because it "rings
of negligence" and has a "negligence complexion." Also, the
court found the language capable of being misunderstood as
subjecting the plaintiff to a two-step burden of proof, requiring
him to prove not only the existence of a defect but also that the
defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. Addressing
the substance of comment i, the court, critical of the "consumer
expectations" approach, indicated an unwillingness to negate
liability simply because a consumer's expectations have been
lowered in some way-for example, by the obviousness of a
product's defect.32
The next flash forward is to Barker, involving a plaintiff-employee who was
seriously injured "when he jumped off a high-lift loader that the defendant had
manufactured and leased to the plaintiff s employer."33 The employee leaped from
the loader when it began to tip over on sloping terrain, a risk of which he had not
been warned.34 The trial in Barker occurred after Cronin was handed down. The
trial judge fashioned his instructions to the jury in a heroic effort to explain
Cronin's rulings to them.Y The jury returned a verdict for the defendant-
manufacturer.36 Without approving the jury instructions, the California Supreme
Court's opinion in Barker allowed judgment on the verdict to stand, remarking that
31. Id. at 439.
32. Id at 439-40 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. at 440 (discussing Barker).
34. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 440 (discussing Barker).
35. Id. at 440-41 (discussing Barker).
36. Id. (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (cal. 1978)).
2002]
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products liability law "does not cast the manufacturer into the role of an 'insurer." 37
With this description of a late-nineteenth-century way-station in the long
history of products liability law in California, Gary Schwartz closes Part I of his
162-page article of four Parts plus an introduction and conclusion. Repeatedly in
the remainder of the article, he continues to expose the embedded influence of
nuances of theory, doctrine, pragmatics, andprinciples of fairness and justice on the
development of products liability law throughout the nation. I recommend that any
reader who wishes to understand fully where we now are, and where we are likely
to go in this development, re-read Gary Schwartz's seminal article with a view to
finding in it the seeds of his extraordinary contributions to the publications of the
ALI in recent years, on tort law generally, and on products liability law especially.
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERSECTING ACTIVITIES
The geographical area that a particular legal system serves may be a locality,
a region, a state, a nation, or, as we look to the future, perhaps even something
closer to global.
As economic, political, social, and cultural relationships in the world around
us become more complex, the range of significantly intersecting activities grows.
As Gary Schwartz recognized in 1979, "Almost any accident, examined closely
enough, can be seen as lying at the intersection of more than one activity or
enterprise." '38 The frequency of legal problems associated with intersecting activities
grows more significant with every increase in the complexity of human
relationships. Gary Schwartz also observed that "the process of attributing the
accident to a particular activity or enterprise is inherently uncertain," ' with further
consequences for the legal system. Gary Schwartz calls attention to an example still
relevant in 2002:
Indeed, these uncertainties virtually compel the abandonment of
the general resource allocation argument for strict liability;
instead, about all that can be done is to choose among
contributing activities or enterprises on the basis of which of them
may be in the best position to reduce the accident risk in a cost-
effective way. But this reformulation of the accident prevention
strategy brings us back at least to the general vicinity of the defect
requirement in existing products liability law.'
37. Id. at 441 (discussing Barker).
38. Id. at 447.
39. Id.
40. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 447 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 53: 785
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Returning in his analysis of underlying principles to negligence law, Gary
Schwartz observes:
Negligence law, in its product applications, seems at first to
take no account of the point that the product manufacturer stands
in a kind of contractual relationship with the product purchaser;
it imposes on the manufacturer the same obligation of reasonable
care as it places on defendants in "stranger cases" of the sort
typified by Brown v. Kendall. This obligation is anchored in a
fairness principle (that a potential injurer should not egoistically
rank his own welfare above the welfare of others) and an accident
prevention principle (that a party should be discouraged from
engaging in conduct which entails risks to others that exceed its
benefits to the actor). Warranty law, by contrast, is drawn directly
from the essentially contractual relationship between the
consumer and the manufacturer.4
Here, again, we see the recurring theme of the interrelationship of doctrine,
policy, and principles of fairness.
V. COMPARING RISKS AND BENEFITS
Gary Schwartz takes note of a challenge to the efficacy of risk-benefit
comparisons on the ground of alleged incompetency of juries, and ajudge or panel
of judges as well, to perform this function.
The tort dimension of strict "defect" liability has been
objected to in recent years on grounds that juries are somewhat
prone to be unduly favorable to plaintiffs in product design cases,
and on the broader basis that sophisticated risk-benefit balancing
is something that the process of adjudication is incapable of
handling. Neither of these objections is entirely persuasive. The
complaint about the jury lacks empirical verification.... The
second objection rests on the claim that product design cases are
"polycentric" in Lon Fuller's sense and hence unsuitable for
adjudication. Given Fuller's own examples ofpolycentricity, this
claim seems exaggerated.42
41. Id. at 449 (footnotes omitted).
42. Id. at 449-450 (footnotes omitted).
2002]
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Gary Schwartz adds:
If product design litigation is to achieve satisfying results, the law
is obliged to formulate standards which identify the proper
variables, which are capable of being administered in the civil
trial context, and which provide the jury with effective, intelligent
guidance.43
My views about the inapplicability to strict products liability of Lon Fuller's
seminal explanations of polycentricity and fitness for adjudication, and the ALI's
published comments on comparison of costs and benefits, are compatible with the
excerpts from Gary Schwartz's 1979 California Law Review article, quoted
immediately above. With respect to comparing costs and benefits, I have so stated
elsewhere recently in Judging in the American Legal System, 44 where I considered
"three comparisons that might influence one's views about what the law in some
jurisdictions now says, or should say if the law is now unsettled, about whether the
manufacturer of a product line is subject to liability for all or part of the loss of
which the product line is a cause., 4' The three comparisons are identified as, first,
"Is the COST greater than the benefit?"; second, "Is the RISK greater than the
utility?"; and third, "Is the BURDEN less than the PL?, 46 Then follows a
consideration of the various possible meanings of each of these capitalized terms
(COST, BURDEN, and PL) and the pragmatic consequences of using one or
another of the possible meanings in particular contexts of the law of tort, contract,
warranty, and strict legal accountability.47 Also noted there is the fact that one of the
possible meanings of "defect" is very close to a meaning proposed by Professor
David Owen in Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: "'Micro-
Balancing" Costs.
41
All in all, Gary Schwartz's repeated reminders of the fluidity and
interdependence of all the rules, rulings, policy analyses, and discussion of
underlying principles help us understand that he is interested in bridging gaps in our
present knowledge and understanding. Thus, when describing a ruling by the
California Supreme Court in 1978, in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,49 he says,
"This ruling all but bridges the dramatic gap that previously separated negligence
from strict liability."'
43. Id. at 451.
44. ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM § 19.3.3, at 513-17 (1999)
45. Id. at 513.
46. Id. (using "PL" as in Judge Learned Hand's metaphor).
47. Id. at 513-17.
48. Id. at 516 (referencing David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness:
"Micro-Balancing" Costs, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1661, 1689-92 (1997)).
49. 575 P.2d 1162 (1978).
50. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 456.
[Vol. 53: 785
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VI. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The thoughtful reflections by Gary Schwartz on tort law and products liability
law throughout his professional career are indicative of his own expectations for the
future, and they surely influence our own. His perceptive and insightful comments
on comparing risks and benefits are as relevant in 2002 as they were in 1979. Also
his expression, in the ALI's Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
Harm (Basic Principles),5' of insights about different potential meanings of
"recklessness," dependent on context and other factors, is likely to influence
judicial reasoning not only in the more general context of discussing principles of
tort law but also in reasoning about the nature and scope of liability for harm to
which a product contributes.
Courts must still grapple not only with the relationships and distinctions
between intentional tort and negligence but also with the relationships between
negligence and strict liability, and with relationships between strict liability and
liability for aggravated misconduct. One reason this is so is that sources of guidance
to the courts, including the ALI's Restatements as well as the "primary" guidance
in statutes and precedents, are susceptible to contrasting and conflicting
interpretations.
One of many ways in which courts' needs for aid and guidance are especially
acute is that courts need aid and guidance in relation to issues about whether
responsibility of a corporate entity for harms that have already materialized, in part
but not yet fully, can be escaped through withdrawal of assets of the corporate
entity. As the problem has become more pervasively recognized, managers of
corporate entities and their liability insurers have become increasingly sophisticated
in developing ways of protecting assets frombeing reachedthrough legal pro cesses.
These ways have included transfers among entities having interlocking ownership
and management. How will courts resolve disputes of this kind? 2
As all of us who came under the influence of Gary Schwartz and his
distinguished scholarly contributions in varied contexts know, he had a unique
combination of interests and talents for scholarly contributions that are both
stimulating and seminal. I join the South Carolina Law Review and others in
saluting a treasured friend and colleague.
5 1. BAsic PRINCIPLES Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 3.
52. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTSLIABILITY § 12 cmt. e Reporters' Note
(1998) (citing Schmoll v. AC&S, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988) where "the court found that a
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